ALBERT HERTER

‘THE BEST THING I HAVE READ ON SEC-GOLDMAN ( SO FAR),’ by James Kwak at baselinescenario .com.

In Uncategorized on April 21, 2010 at 09:07

The Best Thing I Have Read on SEC-Goldman (So Far)

Posted: 20 Apr 2010 08:06 PM PDT

By James Kwak

Actually, two things, both by Steve Randy Waldman.

Part of Goldman’s defense is that it was in the nature of CDOs for there to be a long side and a short side, and the investors on the long side (the ones who bought the bonds issued by the CDO) must have known that there was a short side, and hence there was no need to disclose Paulson’s involvement. Waldman completely dismantles this argument, starting with a point so simple that most of us missed it: a CDO is just a way of repackaging other bonds (residential mortgage-backed securities, in this sense), so it doesn’t necessarily have a short investor any more than a simple corporate bond or a share of stock does. Since a synthetic CDO by construction mimics the characteristics of a non-synthetic CDO, the same thing holds. (While the credit default swaps that go into constructing the synthetic CDO have long and short sides, the CDO itself doesn’t have to.) Here’s the conclusion:

“Investors in Goldman’s deal reasonably thought that they were buying a portfolio that had been carefully selected by a reputable manager whose sole interest lay in optimizing the performance of the CDO. They no more thought they were trading ‘against’ short investors than investors in IBM or Treasury bonds do. In violation of these reasonable expectations, Goldman arranged that a party whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of investors would have significant influence over the selection of the portfolio. Goldman misrepresented that party’s role to the manager and failed to disclose the conflict of interest to investors.”

Waldman follows this up with an analysis of the premium that Goldman extracted from the buy-side investors and transferred to Paulson (in exchange for its own fee). The point here is that Goldman could have simply put Paulson and the buy-side investors together and had Paulson buy CDS on RMBS directly — but that would have affected the price of the deal, because Paulson wanted to take a big short position. So instead, they created the CDO (a new entity) and then drummed up buyers for it, in order to avoid moving the market against Paulson. The advantage of thinking about it this way is it shows what the function of a market maker is and how that differs from the role Goldman played in this transaction.

The posts are long, so sit back and enjoy.

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: